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September-October 1961

University of Missouri

BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT REVIEW

Vol. II—No. 5 **September-October 1961**

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BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT REVIEW

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Notes About The Authors

OLIVER FINK

Mr. Fink began his newspaper career in St. Louis immediately after high school and returned there after attending the University of Missouri. Florida called but work on newspapers prevailed.

Upon returning to St. Louis Mr. Fink began a 26 year career with the Post Dispatch as reporter, assistant editor and feature writer. A specialty was personality sketches of the so-called profile type including interviews of well-known personalities. This experience, plus the past four years in the University's Office of Public Information, qualified him to do the Dean Bradshaw story.

ROY KELLER

Mr. Keller taught mathematics for several years before joining the University of Missouri five years ago. After a year on the Rolla campus he came to Columbia as a graduate student in Mathematics and as a computer programmer.

He is now Director of the Computer Research Center and has completed the research for a Ph.D. in Mathematics. Work in electronics is represented by 2½ years as a Ground Electronics Officer and present status in the Air Force Reserve. Professional activities include Secretary of the Datatron (Burroughs 204-205) Society.

PATERSON, RAPP

Dr. Robert W. Paterson is now Director of the *Research Center* of the School of Business and Public Administration which was formed by the recent merger of the Bureaus of Business and Economic Research *and* Government Research. One of his interests, as Professor of Business Research, is the Problems Course for graduate students for which Mr. Rapp developed materials on foreign aid.

Before joining the University two years ago, Dr. Paterson had extensive research and consulting experience. He served from 1945 through 1949 as a foreign service officer in the U. S. Department of State with assignments in Brazil and the Caribbean.

John Rapp's special economic field is fiscal and financial analysis. He contributed to the *Center's* 1960 study "Financing Missouri's Road Needs." Present employment with the U. S. Bureau of Public Roads in Washington is on problems of highway cost allocation which will also form the basis for his doctoral dissertation at the University.

RICHARD BOLLING

Richard Bolling, Democratic Representative from the Fifth Congressional District of Missouri, is himself a member of the House Committee on Rules. Entering the legislative arena in 1949, he has served in the 81st to the 86th Congress.

Rep. Bolling received his A.B. and A.M. degrees from the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee. He later worked toward a Ph.D. in history and political science at Vanderbilt University.

Entering the Army in 1941, Rep. Bolling subsequently served four years overseas and was assistant to the chief of staff of General MacArthur. After World War II Rep. Bolling, a teacher by profession, became director of veteran affairs and student activities at the University of Kansas City, Kansas City, Missouri and has since resided in Kansas City.

WILLIAM L. BRADSHAW
In 1946—The Year He Became Dean

WILLIAM L. BRADSHAW
Administrator, Educator, and Public Servant

OLIVER F. FINK
Assistant Director
Office of Public Information
University of Missouri

Your career has been one of effective leadership and distinguished achievements in four broad lines of endeavor: teaching political science subjects, participating in the civic affairs of your community, accepting responsible assignments in the public service of the State of Missouri, and University administration.

The above excerpt from the Alumni Citation of Merit in Public Administration awarded last April to Dr. William Leonard Bradshaw, retiring Dean of the University of Missouri School of Business and Public Administration, by the School and the University Alumni Association probably summarizes as well as any few words could the contributions, public and educational, of Dean Bradshaw.

The tribute is especially pertinent since it came from those who have worked closest with him—faculty colleagues of many years as well as former students whom he had advised, directed, berated if they failed to do their best work, and whom he had always sought to understand.

The Citation is one of many ways in which Dr. Bradshaw has received recognition for his ability, and willingness to use it, as a political scientist, authority on Missouri constitutional problems, on local government and political parties, active participant in public affairs, administrator, exacting but helpful teacher, and lively talker and lecturer. At the same ceremony, an oil portrait of the Dean was presented to the University by the University's Upsilon Chapter of Alpha Kappa Psi, national professional business fraternity, in appreciation of his services to students.

Recognition of Dean Bradshaw's ability and integrity has included his election to public office and to key posts in various civic and professional organizations; appointment to important State boards and commissions; and awards from professional and civic groups.

ADMINISTRATOR

During the period of Dr. Bradshaw's Deanship the School of Business and Public Administration has enlarged its full-time faculty about three-fold, has increased in enrollment by nearly five times, has greatly expanded its offerings in both courses and curricula, has added new services of value to the state as a whole as well as to student education, has broadened graduate programs, and has moved into a new and modern building.

Dr. Bradshaw has headed the School of Business and Public Administration at the University as Dean of the Faculty for the

past 15 years. On August 31 he is retiring from the deanship, having reached the University's compulsory retirement age of 65 years for administrative officers; he will continue on the faculty as professor of political science, with the additional title of Dean Emeritus.

Looking back, when Dr. Bradshaw took over the deanship of the School of Business and Public Administration, emphasis seemed to be on economic theory and political science. Alert to the demands of the student body and the ever-increasing educational requirements of today's business and public administration, Dean Bradshaw and the faculty with which he always worked closely put growing emphasis on business administration in order to round out well-balanced curricula in several fields that would be adequate to meet needs.

When he was appointed to head the School, in June 1946, Dean Bradshaw was already a veteran on the faculty, having been a member since 1927; and he was also an alumnus of the University. That background provided inestimable value to the new administrator, for on taking over the position he was at once confronted by a most formidable burden of responsibility.

Enrollment explosion

The responsibility was one that faced every administrator at the University in the first years following World War II. In 1946 the University entered an era of almost explosive enrollment increase. Like educational institutions throughout the country, it was unprepared after World War II restrictions, and available facilities and teachers were distressingly inadequate.

CHART I

NET ANNUAL ENROLLMENT SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION



Enrollment figures charted for the School count only once each individual student enrolled at any time during the year. Those from other divisions of the University taking courses in Business and Public Administration are counted in the other division where registered. Enrollment in recent years has stabilized at double the pre War II peaks.

CHART II

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION GRADUATES (Yearly Totals)



In 1915 only one student received a B.S. in Commerce. Growth over the years, shown in the chart, was interrupted by World War II. After the flood of post war veterans, numbers of graduates stabilized much above the pre war trend.

In the fall semester of 1945 the University of Missouri enrollment on the Columbia campus was only 3,938 students. In the fall of 1946 the enrollment, swollen by thousands of returned veterans, skyrocketed to a total of 10,593 students; by the fall semester of 1947 the enrollment at Columbia reached 11,439.

For the School of Business and Public Administration the increase was, of course, proportionate. The enrollment in the School had been 119 students in the fall semester of 1945; it was 509 in the first semester of Dr. Bradshaw's deanship, totaled 885 by the fall semester of 1947, and a staggering 1,107 in the fall of 1948. The net annual enrollment excluding duplicates for the 1948-49 academic year (that is, the total number of individual students enrolled for the period) was 1,429.

Problems to be met

To meet this crisis in education Dean Bradshaw, like all the University's division heads, had to find more classroom space, work out courses and curricula and schedules to accommodate all the students, get back such former faculty members scattered by the war as would come back, find new teachers at a time when every other college in the country was competing for educators.

The School had only four classrooms, and only 16 full-time members on the faculty. Through University-wide cooperation and the use of temporary buildings space was found for classrooms. The 16 faculty members in the School, a number of whom had been with the School for many years and all of whom were dedicated to teaching and ready to give their full support, time, abilities and cooperation, formed the nucleus around which to build a more adequate teaching staff.

The crisis of the postwar years was a severe test of the administrative ability of the new Dean, who showed a capacity for organization, for working with his staff as the leader rather than the "boss," for delegating authority and responsibility without constant interference, and for understanding departmental problems, that kept the School a closely knit, smooth-working, integrated division for 15 years.

The maturity and zeal of the veterans were a major asset in meeting the postwar crisis. Being highly motivated, they endured with a minimum of criticism, poor housing, overcrowded classes and some inexperienced teachers.

CHART III

TWO ERAS COMPARED



The left hand column shows that 1910 students graduated during the School's first 32 years. The right hand column shows the past 15 years during which there were 4863.

Still more students

While the tremendous enrollment in the University dropped gradually in the early 1950's as the influx of veterans began to subside, the immediate postwar years were a foretaste of problems ahead. Normal enrollment continued a steady climb far greater than the gradual drop in veterans, so that University facilities and faculties have never ceased to be overtaxed despite the remarkable expansion program of the University in the past few years.

During the winter semester that closed last June the Columbia campus enrollment was again at 10,660 about where it stood in 1946. The School of Business and Public Administration had 607 students enrolled for the past winter semester, and a net annual enrollment of 707 for the 1960-61 academic year.

A point of interest in the growth of the School throughout the years is that from the first academic year in which it was established, 1914-15, through the academic year of 1945-46, immediately before Dr. Bradshaw became Dean, the grand total of net annual enrollments excluding duplicates for the 32 years was 6,121 students; during the time he has been Dean, through the 1960-61 academic year, the net annual enrollments for the 15 years have totaled 12,436 students. Further, from 1914-15 through 1945-46 the grand total of all graduates was 1,910, compared to a grand total of 4,863 from 1946-47 through the 1960-61 academic year.

Nor do the bare B & PA enrollment figures give a true picture of the entire load carried by the School—and its teaching staff, with a full-time faculty that even now numbers only some 45 members. Students are enrolled in the School only during their junior and senior years, but the School teaches 20 hours of courses for University students in the freshman and sophomore years which do not show up on the B & PA enrollment, as they are enrolled in other divisions.

Economics and political science serve in a dual capacity for students in B & PA and in Arts and Science. All of their courses are approved and all full-time teachers are officially members of the Arts and Science staff. A candidate for an A.B. degree may major in economics or in political science, or elect courses in either field as in any other department of Arts and Science.

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS

Changes in the School during the past 15 years go, of course, far beyond enrollment figures and number of graduates, important as they are in showing the School's role in education. The most obvious outward change is the new B & PA Building, which the Dean considers one of the high points in his career as far as tangible gains are concerned.

In 1946 the School was crowded into one of the older campus structures which it had long since outgrown and which became wholly inadequate when the flood of postwar students started. Classrooms were too few and too small, general facilities were lacking, faculty and staff were packed two, three or more in small offices, and even the Dean and his secretarial staff had inadequate facilities.

The "tangible" gains

Now the School has a modern, functional, and attractive three-story and ground floor building for office, classroom and laboratory use, bringing all the activities of the School under one roof, and allowing some room for expansion. The structure was completed and furnished in the fall of 1959 at a cost of $1,500,000 in funds provided by the University's share of a recent State Building Bond Issue.

Much as Dean Bradshaw is gratified that the School has a new building, what he terms the "intangible" gains that add to the services of the School, to youth and to the State, clearly give him the greatest sense of accomplishment. He does not take personal credit for them for many were developed from suggestions of the faculty, secretaries, and students in response to new needs and new times.

His greatest pride is in helping to recruit and develop a good faculty, which he considers second to none in any School with comparable resources. Emphasizing that an educational institution should avoid in-breeding, he explains that only two of the full-time teaching staff for 1961-62 received the doctorate from the University of Missouri; the other 37 doctorates were secured from 17 different universities. Furthermore, many of the teachers had experience in one or more colleges when they came to Missouri.

The Dean also points with pride to the graduates of the School, both before and during his deanship. Many of them hold important positions in business, in government, and in professions.

Gains education-wise

When listing the "intangible" gains, Dean Bradshaw mentions first the establishment of the two research bureaus within the School—the Bureau of Government Research, set up in 1957, and the Bureau of Business and Economic Research, established in 1959. Their recent consolidation as the School of Business and Public Administration *Research Center* he considers

as an even more important gain for the School and the University, one he views as providing a major opportunity for future development and service.

The *Center* will, among other things,

- **carry on basic research in business, economic and government problems and thereby reach into a broad field of both business and public administration throughout the state**
- **initiate and undertake specific research projects in business and economics**
- **cooperate with federal, state, and private agencies in research of state-wide or industry-wide interest**
- **thereby facilitate research by faculty members and by graduate students.**

Research has a high place in the Dean's appraisal of an educational institution.

Dean Bradshaw lists as a significant advance by the School and University the *Executive Development Program* for training promising management personnel in the Kansas City area, a program originally initiated at the request of the Westinghouse Company. He looks on it as in keeping with the University's policy of "extending the campus beyond Columbia and Rolla," as typified by the cooperative programs with several state colleges and establishment of the University-Normandy Residence Center.

The *Executive Development Program* was started in 1954 in cooperation with the Graduate School and Adult Education and Extension Service (now called Continuing Education). It began as a three-year non-resident training program offering Certificates in Business Administration; in 1956 it was expanded to include a fourth year of study leading to a Master in Business Administration (non-resident). Another program leading to a Master in Public Administration is to be offered in the Kansas City area.

The activities of the School in cooperation with the Division of Continuing Education in sponsoring short courses, seminars, and conferences are also considered of much importance by the Dean. At present the School and Continuing Education are planning study courses for Chartered Life Underwriters and for Chartered Property Casualty Underwriters. He also looks with personal satisfaction on the growing and broadening interest of business and industry in scholarships, contributions to student loans, and endowment of professorships.

Faculty policy committee

One of the early administrative actions of Dean Bradshaw to bring about closer integration of the School's operations was that of the faculty electing the five members of the committee on educational policy. The function of the committee is chiefly to consider educational changes regarding courses and curricula proposed by departments of the School, decide whether such proposals have merit, and refer them to the faculty for further consideration.

Employer-graduate liaison

The Placement Office has become an important adjunct of the School under Dean Bradshaw. It was started in 1936 but became quiescent during World War II. Dean Bradshaw re-established it, and its part in bringing students and prospective employers together has steadily grown. In 1956 the Placement activities became an integral part of the Dean's office staff and later was placed under the direction of an Assistant to Dean.

The office is a major service to students looking for jobs and to business and industrial firms and administrative agencies looking for adequately trained employees. Each year more and more prospective employers have been sending representatives to interview candidates for degrees; this year 148 visited the campus. Dean Brad-

shaw attributes the gain to greater employer concern in getting just the right man for the job; an additional reason may well be the mounting prestige of the School, for 75 per cent of the interviewing firms are of national stature.

A broadening of curricula

At the time the School and University entered into the present era of expansion, the School was offering five curricula: General Business, Accounting, Finance and Banking, Public Administration, and Statistics. At an early faculty meeting after Dean Bradshaw took his office, additional curricula in Marketing and in Management were approved. Later a curriculum in Real Estate and Insurance was established, ultimately to be divided into two separate curricula, in Real Estate and in Insurance. Later came the curriculum in Secretarial Science.

The nine business curricula lead to a B.S. in Business Administration; the curriculum in Public Administration offers a B.S. in Public Administration. For a few years during Dean Bradshaw's tenure a degree of B.S. in Statistics was offered, and then dropped.

A year ago the Department of Economics and Business was divided. Two departments were created, one the Department of Economics and the other the Department of Business Management. This coming fall semester the School will have a new curriculum in Economics leading to a B.S. in Business Administration degree.

Despite the increase in curricula, this school retains much of the liberal traditions inherited from Economics and Political Science, which constitute two of the four departments. Having an undergraduate major in Mathematics with some 15 hours of Psychology, the Dean is pleased that several members of his faculty are interested in the renewed emphasis on mathematics and the behavioral sciences for business students. He would be delighted to see more advanced liberal arts courses required of business students.

The School has also, during the Dean's tenure, broadened graduate programs in various fields; the programs are under supervision of the Graduate School, and lead to the Master of Arts, Master of Science, and Ph.D. degrees.

THE DEAN'S PERSONALITY

The man who saw the School through 15 years of unparalleled growth—in students, in staff, in facilities, and in prestige—is one of the best-known personalities on the campus. Outspoken, positive in his views and ready to express them, though also equally ready to debate them, he presents a first impression of sharpness that actually covers a kindly, understanding, perceptive nature—a man who likes people, is interested in their problems, has an extraordinarily wide acquaintance, and is at any time ready to help out with public or private affairs where help is needed.

Members of his staff have almost always felt they could get a sympathetic hearing from him and a decision in the interest of the School. He never turned down a proposal from one of them without first wanting to know how it could be carried out and what the results would be, and if he accepted it, he backed it fully. The faculty always felt free to go to him with new ideas.

Anyone who wants to see him has ready access to his office, whether faculty, students or visitors. He likes to talk to people, and his conversation is interlaced with humor, witticisms that often touch on sarcasm, outspoken and sometimes caustic appraisals of people or situations, and sharp observations; he never fails to hold the attention of his listener. He has always been in great demand as an after dinner speaker and lecturer. Because he can keep his lectures

alive, many students who have taken his courses look on them as among the most interesting in the School.

He is held in high respect by the B & PA students. He does not hesitate to criticize and scold if he feels such action is needed, but he always tries to understand their problems and is always ready to help and advise. He has set high standards of achievement for the students, and he expects them to come up to those standards; if they do not, he "takes them apart" as one staff member described it. Then he is ready to work with them, if they show willingness to try. If he suspects they are trying to get by without working, he loses patience.

He is credited by his staff and friends with a "phenomenal" memory, which covers individual student's records, the smallest details of events and people throughout the state for many years, and the major changes in the University. He keeps in close touch with School activities. If he delegates a responsibility to a staff member or student, he does not interfere.

The secretarial staff in the School, like most people who work closely with him has come to regard him with considerable affection because of his interest in them, lack of stuffiness and pretense, and failure to blame them unduly for mistakes. He enjoys having coffee with them in the conference room adjoining his office.

Essentially modest despite his extrovert character, he shows embarrassment when praised, and is inclined to pass off tribute in public with a humorous quip. Nevertheless, he is proud of the honors he has received, especially of the tribute paid him by alumni, students and faculty in awarding him the Alumni Citation. Another thing that touched him deeply was receipt of an appreciation award in 1959 from Alpha Kappa Psi, national professional business fraternity, and its University chapter. The award was presented to him and six other faculty members with at least 25 years of service.

PARTIAL TO POLITICS

Second only to his interest in the School of Business and Public Administration and its progress as a teaching and research institution is the Dean's interest in politics. Not as a *politician* but as a student of politics and political science, and his interest covers the entire field, with emphasis on political parties (his first love), legislation, and local government. He is a partisan in party politics, and doesn't hesitate to make it known.

That partisanship does not enter into his teaching, his judgment of issues, or of his appraisal of political trends and politicians. His overall attitude toward politics is thoroughly objective, and he discusses politics —one of his favorite conversation pieces— with shrewd insight, lively and sometimes caustic comments on politics and politicians, and perceptive, non-partisan analysis.

EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES

To Missourians in general Dean Bradshaw is perhaps best known as one of the leaders in the movement for the new State Constitution that was adopted by the people of the state in 1945. He was a member of the Committee of Ten which set up the organization for calling the 1943-44 convention, and he aided in preparing manuals for the use of delegates in their deliberations. He was given a leave by the University so he could work full-time on the convention.

A constitution framer

As a delegate-at-large to the convention Dr. Bradshaw was chairman of the Local Government Committee for Rural Counties, one of the two committees on local government. He was also a member of the com-

mittees on State Finance except taxation; Education; Library; and Information (Submission and Address to the People). He was chairman of the subcommittee which wrote the "Address to the People." It was printed with the revised Constitution for use in the campaign for its approval by the voters. It was also widely used as a separate campaign document in behalf of the new Constitution.

He was also chairman of a special committee to prepare the *Schedule* but being busy with the "Address" he asked another delegate to assist him. His draft, with an amendment suggested by a third delegate, was adopted by the Convention. Credit was given to them by the Dean in handling the *Schedule* on the floor of the Convention.

After taking part in the drafting of the new Constitution, Dean Bradshaw was an active leader in presenting it to the citizens of the State, so they could understand its principal features, and in campaigning for its adoption. In this activity he was assisted by a number of other faculty members. In all Dean Bradshaw made more than 100 major public speeches in 20 different counties, and also made some radio appeals in behalf of the Constitution.

In the early years after the adoption of the Constitution, Dean Bradshaw was on the program of such organizations as the

- **American Political Science Association**
- **Southern Political Science Association**
- **Midwestern Political Science Association**
- **National Municipal League**
- **Kansas and Missouri Municipal Leagues.**

He also has participated in conferences on state constitutional revisions at Columbia University and state universities or other groups in Kansas, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee. He participated in a state-wide campaign in Tennessee. He has been the principal publicist of the Missouri Constitutional Revision.

Columbia civic leader

That willingness to give his best and work for something in which he believed extends to all the Dean's activities and interests. It was early shown after he was elected to the Columbia City Council in 1934, an office he held for two terms. He has been active in University, business, church, and other civic groups in the community.

Other activities

In addition to the activities in public affairs already mentioned, Dr. Bradshaw, as field agent for the American Municipal Association, assisted in reactivating the Missouri Municipal League and served as secretary in 1934-35, director in 1936-38, and as a member of its Tax Committee in 1937-38. In 1953-55, he served on the Missouri State Reorganization Commission, the so-called "Little Hoover Commission," by appointment of Gov. Phil M. Donnelly. In 1957 he was appointed, by then Gov. Blair, to a six-year term as chairman of the State Savings and Loan Commission.

BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

Except for brief periods, Dr. Bradshaw has lived in Missouri his entire life. He was born March 23, 1896, and reared on a farm near Versailles in Morgan County, and attended the East Prairie country school. He received his high school education at Barnett Institute, a private school, and then attended Warrensburg Normal School, now Central Missouri State College, where he graduated in 1915. He taught in the Olean, Missouri, high school in 1915-16, and received a B.S. in Education degree from the University of Missouri in 1917.

During 1917-1919, Dr. Bradshaw served in the United States Army as a private, a second lieutenant, and a first lieutenant, being assigned to the 128th Field Artillery,

35th Division (Missouri-Kansas National Guard) with which he went to France. The Dean says he is one of the few survivors of that Division who did not know Captain (later, Major) Harry S. Truman of the 129th Field Artillery. He became intimately acquainted with Truman as Presiding Judge of the Jackson County Court. In fact, they met in the office of former Dean F. A. Middlebush in the old Business and Public Administration Building when Bradshaw was writing his doctoral dissertation on the Missouri County Court. Incidentally, he predicts that the verdict of history will rate Truman as one of our great Presidents.

He spent four years on the family farm after the War before resuming his education. Dr. Bradshaw received his A.M. degree from the University of Missouri in 1924, then taught at Central Missouri State College in the summer of 1925, and was an assistant professor of economics and government at the University of Puerto Rico in 1925-27. He received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Iowa in 1930.

Dr. Bradshaw joined the University of Missouri teaching staff in 1927 as an instructor in political science; he was promoted to assistant professor in 1930; to associate professor of political science in 1933; and to full professor in 1941.

He has served as a member of the legislative committee of the Missouri Association of Social Welfare and of the Missouri Children's Code Commission. He is a director of the Boone County National Savings and Loan Association, past president of the University Community Teachers' Association, and of the Columbia Kiwanis Club; and a deacon (and one time board chairman and trustee) of the Columbia Christian Church; and a trustee of Christian College.

Other memberships include the American Political Science Association (and three regional affiliated associations); American Society of Public Administration, the National Municipal League; and served on the executive committee of the American Association of University Professors. He is a life member and second vice president of the State Historical Society of Missouri. He belongs to four national scholastic honor societies as follows: Alpha Pi Zeta in social science; Order of Artus in economics; Phi Sigma Alpha in political science; and Beta Gamma Sigma in business administration, serving on its executive committee for six years. He belongs to Delta Sigma Pi, a professional business fraternity.

In 1945 the Missouri State Teachers Association conferred its *distinguished service award* on him and three other college teachers in recognition of their contributions to Education as members of the 1943-44 State Constitutional Convention. In 1956 he was honored as the Optimist Citizen-of-the-Year. In 1959 he was made a life member of the Missouri and Columbia Real Estate Association in appreciation of his interest in real estate education.

In 1926 he married the former Miss Doris Crump, B.J. 1925, of San Jose, California. They have a son, William L. Jr., A.B. cum laude in economics from Dartmouth College, and a graduate student at Indiana who is now in the Traffic Management Department of the Louisville and Nashville Railway, Louisville, Kentucky. They also have a foster son, John R. Jutton, B.J. 1960, who is with the Associated Press in Little Rock, Arkansas. John married Mignon Clement of Columbia and they have a daughter, Kelley Lucille.

AS DEAN EMERITUS

With his retirement as Dean, Dr. Bradshaw will continue to teach *Political Parties* and hopes to devote some time to research and writing which he has long wanted to do. During the next year he would like to bring up to date the history of the School

of Business and Public Administration, carrying it through the World War II years and his tenure. He wrote the brief chapter on the School which appears in "A History of the University of Missouri, 1839-1939," by the late Dr. Jonas Viles, professor of history at the University. He said he also would like to leave a record of his experiences and interpretations of the Missouri Constitutional Convention of 1943-44.

Dean Bradshaw in addition to his contribution to the history of the University has written extensively throughout his career. He is author of one of the University of Missouri Studies, "The Missouri County Court," published in 1931, and co-author of another, "Township Organization in Missouri," published in 1936. He is also the author of numerous published articles on the Missouri Constitutional Convention, county and other local government, Political Parties and Legislation.

Computer Research Center at U. of Mo.

ROY F. KELLER
Director, Computer Center
University of Missouri

The University of Missouri organized a Computer Research Center utilizing a Burroughs 204 digital computer which was purchased in the spring of 1959. The computer was installed and the Center was put into full operation Feb. 1, 1960; it is located on the bottom floor of the New Business and Public Administration Building. Since that date the computer has been utilized in research and educational programs of the University on the average of 12 hours a day.

THE DIGITAL COMPUTER

One of the most ingeneous machines ever invented is the digital computer. Today it receives a great deal of attention and complete credit for accomplishments which it only helps achieve. The reason is that information which the public receives is in a form which makes it appear that the machine is somewhat of a super-human, rather than a tool which must be manipulated by humans.

A digital computer, like all machines, must be controlled by some means. Being a somewhat sophisticated machine, not always requiring an operator, it can be controlled by what is called a *program* which is stored in the computer. A program is a set of specific instructions to the computer telling it exactly *what to do* and *when* to do it. Thus, although it is not always obvious to an observer, the computer while running is always under the control of a program.

Physical Description

A computer is an electronic device and constructed from electronic components. The principal elements are vacuum tubes or transistors, resistors, condensers, diodes, and relays. Essential parts of a computer are: the storage device for memory, the central processor, the control unit, the input device, and the output device. In present day computers the storage device is a magnetic drum, ferrite core, or in some cases a mercury delay line. The central processor is the unit which carries out the operations that a computer is capable of doing. The control unit, as the name indicates, is the means of controlling the computer's operations. The purposes of the input and output devices are indicated from their names. A somewhat simplified diagram of a computer is given in Figure 1.

AN ELECTRIC COMPUTER



Capabilities

All computers are similar with respect to the operations of which they are capable. However, in order for any computer to perform an operation it must be commanded to do it. A *program* is a list of these commands. Briefly the operations can be classified as follows:

1. **Arithmetic operations—add, subtract, multiply, divide, and modifications of these arithmetic operations, such as add absolute, subtract absolute.**
2. **Using a so-called register for a tally and decision device, such as keeping a record of how many times a set of operations is done and, after a predetermined number of times instructing the machine to go on to other operations.**
3. **Decision making and branching—operations which change the sequence of commands depending on conditions in the central processor. Some of the conditions are difference in sign of two numbers, or a zero in a particular part of the computer.**
4. **Manipulation and transfer of information within the computer—storing numbers in specific locations, shifting, rounding, and other similar operations.**
5. **Input and output—"read-in" or "write-out" information.**

The larger and newer computers are capable of performing a wide variety of operations in each of the above classes, and of doing them quite rapidly, while older computers have less variety and are slower.

One cannot verbally command a computer to do a particular operation (in the distant future computers may be built to receive verbal commands), so commands must be in a language the computer understands.

Every computer's memory or storage unit is set up to store a specific set of numbers (referred to as words), each containing a certain number of digits; these numbers may be positive or negative. Each number has an address—a specific location in the memory. The address of a number is also a number. For example, if the memory has a capacity of 10,000 locations, then these are normally numbered from 0 to 9999. Every command to the computer is a specific coding of a "word" depending on how the computer is built to interpret the "word."

Binary number system

A frequent question is how the "words" are stored in the memory. Are the symbols 0, 1, 2, —, 9 actually stored in the memory? The answer is no. Electrical systems have no way of making these symbols, so another method is used. The 10 symbols (0, 1, 2, —, 9) of the decimal system are not necessary to represent a numbering system; two symbols could be used just as well (or any number of symbols). The use of two symbols is called a *binary system*. If the symbols 0 and 1 are used for a binary system, the following lists compare the numbers from 0 to 16.

NUMBER SYSTEMS

Decimal	Binary
0	0
1	1
2*	10*
3	11
4**	100**
5	101
6	110
7	111
8	1000
9	1001
10	1010
11	1011
12	1100
13	1101
14	1110
15	1111
16	10,000

Note: $2^1 = 2$ corresponds to $10^1 = 10$*
$2^2 = 4$ corresponds to $10^2 = 100$**
$2^3 = 8$ corresponds to $10^3 = 1000$
$2^4 = 16$ corresponds to $10^4 = 10{,}000$
with respect to the symbols 1 and 0.

One can carry out arithmetic operations with two symbols the same as with ten. For instance, suppose we add 5 and 9 in binary, that is, add 101 and 1001. Adding the first two symbols to the right, we get 2, 1 plus 1, the representation of 2 is 10, hence one is carried and a zero is written in the answer. Continuing, we get 101 + 1001 = 1110 which from the listing above is 14.

$$\begin{array}{r} 101 \\ 1001 \\ \hline 1110 \end{array}$$

Computers do not have symbols 0 and 1, but they do have circuits which can be described as switches. When thinking of switches one would say either *on* or *off*. *On* could represent 1 and *off* could represent 0 —thus a binary system can be represented by circuits. The binary number system, or some modification, is what is actually used for storage and arithmetic operations by computers. Magnetic drums use a magnetic bit for one symbol and the absence of a bit for the other symbol. A core storage uses an electrostatic charge or the absence of a charge for representing the two symbols 0 and 1.

In general, one refers to the length of a "word" of a computer by how many zeros and ones can be stored, and the terminology used is how many bits can be stored. Modern computers range from about 30 up to 48 or 50 bits in each "word." This range allows at least a ten digit decimal number to be stored or used in the operations.

The use of a computer normally, doesn't worry about the binary system since all except the very oldest computers do the converting from decimal to binary internally. That is, the decimal system is used for input, the computer converts to binary, carries out the operations, and converts back to decimal for output.

Programming

The process of writing the commands, and the proper coding for the commands to the computer, is called programming and the individual who does this is called a programmer. If one wants a computer to do work, he must write the correct commands in the proper sequence to accomplish the task. Whether or not he can do this depends on the problem's form, that is, can a sequence of commands be written to do the problem.

There are available many mathematical techniques for analyzing physical problems which can make use of a computer. Also, a considerable amount of mathematical research is now going on to develop new and better techniques. Previous to computers many of these techniques were seldom used because the number of calculations were so numerous that doing them by hand was not practical. With a computer's speed these techniques are now very useful in analyzing physical problems. Therefore, a great deal of scientific research, once halted by the impracticability of doing the many calculations, can now be done with computers. This is one of the greatest contributions that a computer makes to scientific research.

The characteristic of a computer which makes it a very valuable tool is that instructions and information can be stored internally, and the computer has the ability to pick them up (or remember them) when needed; therefore, a computer doesn't need an operator while executing a program. The operation of a computer is a two-step cycle. The steps are: (1) interpret an instruction (in computer terminology, fetch the instruction), (2) execute the instruction. This cycle is repeated over and over again.

Which instruction is next is controlled by the program or the computer itself. Some computers are made to take the next

instruction from the next memory location. For instance, if the computer is executing the instruction in memory location 3000, the next instruction will come from 3001.

Computer programming is a rather tedious and time consuming task when the program is written in the language of the computer (machine language), and it takes considerable ingenuity to write a good program. Now there is available for almost all computers, a program called a compiler or translator which accepts a language closer to the actual problem language and from this writes the necessary instructions in machine language.

A compiler makes the writing of a program easier but a compiled program is seldom as *efficient* as one written by a good programmer. However, a good compiler is a great aid to programming because enough time is saved to more than offset the inefficiencies.

An algebraic oriented language called ALGOL, and a business oriented language called COBOL, were adopted by an international committee about three years ago as universal computer languages. Many computer manufacturers have written programs enabling their existing computers to write machine language programs from statements in ALGOL or COBOL. Some manufacturers had created their own languages and developed their own compiler programs previous to ALGOL and COBOL and still use their own. At present, practically every computer has some type of compiler program. It is hoped that eventually a *common language* will be adopted for all computers.

To sum things up, a computer is a machine and a very good one. Its outstanding characteristic is its ability to be programmed and to accept a great deal of flexibility in a program. Therefore, with enough ingenuity in setting up a program one can get the computer to accomplish many tasks that at first seem impossible. Take for instance, the question of whether or not a computer can think. Of course, the machine on its own *certainly cannot* think. But, with the proper program devised to simulate the human thinking processes, the computer, speaking loosely, could think. A computer will never develop such a program; but there is little doubt that, when the thinking process is understood well enough, some individual will develop the program. In fact, some pretty good attempts at such a program are already in existence.

COMPUTING AT MISSOURI

The University of Missouri has large and active research and modern educational programs. The needs for a computer for these programs are:

1. **To relieve the faculty and senior graduate students of the calculations required in routine statistical analysis of data which they have acquired from their research activities. These calculations are normally done with desk calculators.**
2. **To broaden and extend research by making it possible to carry out techniques in analysis of data, and simulation of physical systems by numerical methods, which require a great deal of computation. These techniques are not used without the aid of a computer because time required by other means is just too great.**
3. **To be used as a tool in the teaching of courses and the development of new disciplines centered around computer activities.**

History

Computing at the University of Missouri dates back to the beginning of the University. The tools for computing at that time were primarily pencil and paper. As desk calculators came along, they were put to use to shorten the time required and improve accuracy. Main types of calculations then were means, standard deviations, and some correlation coefficients. A great deal

of time was required for these calculations even though ingeneous schemes were developed for desk calculators.

In the late 1940's IBM (International Business Machines) card sorting and tabulating equipment was acquired by the University for record keeping and other administrative functions. Soon the faculty discovered these machines could be used quite easily for computing means and standard deviations from data punched on IBM cards. This was probably the start of computing as we now think of it at the University. This means of computing broke away from the old method, of placing numbers on a sheet of paper and making calculations, to coding the numbers on a card and having a machine "read" the card and make the computations. This means of getting computations done appealed to research personnel and soon better machines were being sought. By the early 1950's digital computers were being built and a great deal was being published about their capabilities.

The College of Agriculture, having considerable data to analyze, was the first to use a computer. With the help of the University's Research Council, they rented from the Burroughs Corporation a small E 102 for use by all departments of the University. The E 102 was a small desk size digital computer well suited for doing routine statistical work if its memory capacity of a little over 200 "words" was not exceeded.

Soon the Colleges of Agriculture, Education, Engineering, Arts and Science, and various others had so many problems for the E 102 that it was overloaded—both with respect to time and problems which were too large for it. The next step was an agreement with IBM and State Farm Insurance Company to use the IBM 650 digital computer at State Farm on an after-hour-or-evening shift basis to supplement the E 102. This was started in January 1958 one evening a week. The larger research problems were programmed and run on the 650.

The work done with these two computers convinced some of the faculty that their research could be extended and speeded up by the use of computers. There now seemed to be a method available to satisfy need (2), as well as to take better care of need (1). So the President appointed a committee to investigate the different computers and recommend one for the University. The committee functioned about a year, visiting sites and talking to other Universities who had experience in using computers. After bids were let and considered, the recommendation was to purchase the Burroughs 204 computer and organize a Computer Research Center. In late spring 1959, a Burroughs 204 was purchased. A grant for one-half the cost was obtained from the National Science Foundation. The Research Council and the College of Agriculture each supplied one-fourth of the purchase price.

Organization of Computer Center

The Center is located in the Graduate School to make services equally available to all departments of the University. It is operated so faculty and graduate students can program and run their own problems or have the work done by the computer center staff.

The staff of the Center is composed of a Director (who is a mathematician), a Statistician, an Operation Supervisor, five Programmers, a Maintenance Engineer and Assistant, and a Secretary. At present, the center is utilized on an average of 75 hours a week.

Figure 2 shows the total time in hours per week that the computer has been used beginning September 1960. The regression line, calculated on the computer, shows the overall linear rate of increase in total time.

THE PATTERN OF COMPUTER USE AT MISSOURI



The average increase obtained from this line is about three hours per month. On this basis the computer will be used 120-130 hours per week in about 18 or 19 months, or about January 1963.

The objective of the Center is to give mathematical, statistical, and programming help to satisfy the *three* needs of the University. To accomplish this objective, staff members are available for consulting as well as being active in developing new mathematical and programming techniques and new programs for the computer. The staff also participates in the educational program by teaching some courses in the Department of Mathematics.

Funds for operation of the computer center come from the University's general fund except one-half the fund for maintaining the computer (including Maintenance personnel) comes from the College of Agriculture Statistical Service Department. That Department also has a staff of programmers and operators to handle statistical problems originating in the College of Agriculture.

To support the operation of the computer center, charges are made for computer time; however, no charges are made to faculty of the College of Agriculture since the Statistical Service Department was set up to run their work. Charges are made of $35, $25 or $15 per hour depending on who operates the computer and what time of day or night the problem is run. Faculty research projects are encouraged by waiving charges for the first ten hours.

Operation

Applications are sent to the Director requesting use of the computer. The Director then consults with the individual to deter-

mine whether or not his problem is one in which the computer can be used, and if needed, helps to set up the problem for the computer. Once the problem is organized properly, a member of the center staff is assigned. He may do all programming and work required depending on whether the requester wants to do the work himself or have it done for him. In any case, the staff member gives the requester needed help.

Burroughs 204 Computer

The 204 is a medium size or medium scale computer; this simply means there are some which are slower and some faster in their operations. The time required for an operation is highly dependent on what is called the *access time* of a computer. Access time is the average time it takes a computer to locate an instruction in its memory and interpret the instruction.

Most medium speed computers have magnetic drums for memory units, but the electronic circuits are capable of carrying out operations much faster than the instructions can be picked off a drum. So computer speed is controlled almost completely by the access time. The reason a magnetic drum computer has a comparatively high access time is that the units (read heads) which pick the instruction from the drum are stationary and the drum rotates. Thus, when an instruction in a particular memory location is to be located, the drum must rotate so that the location is under the "read head."

On *core storage* computers this waiting period is eliminated, and most of these are high speed or large scale computers. For comparison of speeds, the 204 adds in 1.7 milliseconds,[1] multiplies in 10.8 m. and divides in 14 m. A high speed computer will do these same operations in about 1/1000 the time—the units are microseconds instead of milliseconds.

Our Burroughs 204 system is very flexible and capable. The system consists of:

a. paper tape and IBM card input devices
b. paper tape, IBM card, typewriter, and on line printer output devices
c. two magnetic tape units
d. a floating point unit

The floating point unit positions the decimal point in all arithmetic operations. The memory of the 204 has 4080 locations each capable of containing a ten decimal digit number plus the sign of the number.

A very small percentage of problems which are done on computers are too large for the 204 system; the only limitations are speed and storage capacity, and with the magnetic tape units the storage capacity is almost unlimited. A large reel of magnetic tape will hold 400,000 ten decimal digit numbers plus sign.

To date there have been but two problems which pressed the limitations of the 204. Both were handled, but a great deal of computer time was used. The largest problem required about 200 hours.

Programming the 204

Machine language programming is the method that has been used almost exclusively for the 204. Recently, however, the Burroughs Corporation wrote a compiler program to accept ALGOL statements. Consequently, more and more programs are being written in ALGOL. (Remember the compiler program converts the ALGOL language to machine language.)[2]

Problems run

Since February 1, 1960, over 200 problems have been programmed. These have varied from very simple five minute machine runs to some requiring over a hundred hours. Problems have come from many Departments of the University.

[1] A millisecond is one-thousandth of a second. A microsecond is one-millionth of a second.

[2] Complete information for programming in machine language or in ALGOL is available.

DEPTS. USING COMPUTER

Economics
Marketing
Accounting and Statistics
Political Science
Animal Husbandry
Dairy Husbandry
Poultry Husbandry
Chemical Engineering
Civil Engineering
Electrical Engineering
Industrial Engineering
Mechanical Engineering
Physics
Psychology
Social Work
Forestry
Sociology
Zoology
Horticulture
Agricultural Engineering
Rural Sociology
Field Crops
Education
Industrial Education
Testing and Counseling
Geology
Journalism
Agricultural Chemistry
University Library
Mathematics
Physiology and Pharmacology
Social Psychology
Soils
Agricultural Extension
Veterinary Pathology

About half the problems have been statistical:

- **means**
- **standard deviations**
- **correlation coefficients**
- **regression lines and curves**
- **analysis of variance**
- **chi-square**
- **T-Tests**

The mathematical ones include:

- **numerical integration**
- **matrix operations**
- **solutions of simultaneous equations**

Library of programs

Once a program has been written and a paper tape punched with instructions, this program tape can be used over and over. An extensive library of programs for the 204 is now available in the Computer Center. This saves many hours of programming time. The instructions can be "read" directly into the computer and used by themselves or incorporated in a larger program.

FUTURE ROLE OF COMPUTERS

Computers at present are a tool for making computations. They will always be used to supplement the activities of humans. However, as capabilities of the machines are increased by better engineering, and as programming methods and languages are improved, more routine operations will be done by computers and additional activities turned over to them.

A great deal of research is being done on new techniques for using computers. This research may soon lead to new *disciplines* for the University. The computer will not be directly responsible, but its use makes it possible to investigate new areas and the thinking in these areas will bring about the changes. What will develop is difficult to predict. An interesting article on the future appears in the June, 1961 issue of the *American Scientist* by Louis Fein, "The Computer—Related Sciences (Synnoetics) at a University in the Year 1975." This article describes how some people are thinking of what will be done.

The next five to ten years will show a tremendous increase in the use of digital computers at the University of Missouri. Increases will be caused by:

1. **Expansion in the number of problems requiring routine mathematical or statistical analysis of data.**
2. **Development of better, and utilization of some old, mathematical and statistical techniques which can be carried out only on a computer.**

PROGRAMS ON FILE

Intercorrelation	Sine
Linear Correlation & Regression	Cosine
Non-Linear Correlation & Regression	Tangent
Analysis of Variance	Cotangent
T-Test	Arcsine
Linear Program Tableaux Loader	Arcosine
Linear Programming	Arctangent
Transportation Model	Arcotangent
Chi-Square	E to the X, Sinh X, Cosh X
Business Game I	E to the Minus X
Linear Equations & Matrix Inversion	10 to the X
Simultaneous Linear Equations	10 to the Minus X
Matrix Equations	X Factorial
Integration	Log to Base 10
Three Point Integration	Log to Base E
Evaluation of a Definite Integral	Roots of Polynomials
Polynomial Integration	Polynomial Evaluation
Polynomial Differentiation	Zeros of a Polynomial
Parabolic & Elliptic Partial Diff. Equations	Polynomial Real Translation
First Order Differential Equations	Polynomial Multiplication
Least Squares Curve Fitting	Polynomial Division
Least Squares Polynomial Surface Fit	Lagrange Interpolation
Binomial Coefficients	Linear Interpolation
Eigenvalues & Eigenvectors	Gamma Function
Probability	Double Precision Arithmetic
Normal Equations from Residuals	Complex Arithmetic
Gramm Schmidt Process	Curve Plotter
Gauss Seidel I	Card Read and Scale
Equilibrium Ratios	Convert to and from MFP and PFP
M C C Input	Print Out of MFP Numbers
M C C Adjoint Input	Print Out with Round Off
M C C Reactivity	X to the Y Power
Flux Integration Input	Selective Mag Tape Read or Write
Flux Integration	Limited Area Mag Tape Read-Write
Absorption Breakdown	Selective Read from Mag Tape
Danger Coefficients Real Input	Automonitor with Card Output
Danger Coefficients Adjoint Input	Mag Tape Transfer
Danger Coefficients	Selective Program Print via 402
Mag Tape Program Call In	Selective Memory Print on 402
Square Root	Mod One Sum of Main Memory
Nth Root	Search Main Memory
Matrix Inversion	Subroutine Duplicator
Matrix Multiplication	Memory Punch
Matrix Addition and Subtraction	Automonitor Flexowriter Output
Bessel Function	Tape Duplicate Check Routine
Bessel Real	Intermediate Printout Subroutine
Bessel Imaginary	Trasfer Main Memory to Mag Tape
Bessel Imaginary Prime	Program or Data Punch Out
Bessel Real Prime	Cal Tech Compiler
Bessel J Sub N	ALGOL Translator
Bessel Function Integral N	ALGOL Library

Note: The mathematical model, operation instructions, and tape are available for each program.

3. **Medical diagnosis methods utilizing a computer.**
4. **Electrical power system analysis and design utilizing a computer.**
5. **Analysis of standardized test scores and development of better tests.**
6. **Use as a teaching aid in regular courses.**
7. **Attempts to simulate human reasoning and other functions of the human body and brain.**
8. **Use in administration of the University such as registration and record keeping.**
9. **Simulation of physical and chemical reactions for a better study of their properties.**

Items (1) through (6) are already underway, that is, new programs have been or are being developed. The others are being thought about. Besides this list, there are many other potential activities probably beyond imagination at present; and it may well be that the University of Missouri will play a significant part in their advancement.

Economic Aid to Less-Developed Nations

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One of the post-World War II problems of the United States and the Soviet Union has been that of developing constructive policies to assist the so-called "less-developed" nations of the world to achieve higher levels of living.

This problem presents severe difficulties for both the United States and the Soviet Union. The dimensions of the problem itself take on unique and constantly changing characteristics in the United States. In the Soviet Union there is less likelihood that a sharp break in longrun objectives will occur. This provides stability in operating programs even though short-run shifts in program direction often take place.

U.S. DISILLUSIONMENT

At the end of World War II Americans hopefully looked forward to a period of relaxed tension, to a time of cooperative relations with the Soviet Union. Soviet performance just, before and during the 1945 United Nations organizational meeting in San Francisco, provided grounds for questioning the sincerity of her interest in establishing a world order based on reasonable competition for international markets. The peoples of the Western World were disheartened by the efforts of the Soviets to undermine the U.N. But we were not then fully awake to the Soviet design for establishing hegemony over the political, economic, and social systems of the non-Communist nations. During the last 16 years this design has become increasingly clear.

THE SOVIET TECHNIQUE

The Soviet Union applies every resource of mind and personality to maintain a popular impression, at home and abroad, of reasonableness toward cooperation with the West. But events have shown that behind this facade lies an indomitable uncompromising belief in a policy of world domination. After all, a workers' revolution cannot bring ultimate happiness unless it spreads.

In the Soviet version, such a revolution can spread only if it provides the physical base for control. Within the democratic traditions of the West, Soviet political encroachment to obtain human development is likened to a cancerous growth; the means to an end become an end.

NEUTRAL VIEWS

Often forgotten in foreign aid discussions in Washington and Moscow are the attitudes that exist in neutral nations like Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Indonesia, and even in Yugoslavia. A Soviet official may fail to appreciate the reluctance with which a small nation welcomes its tenders of aid.

But, if recent history is indicative of the purpose of Soviet aid, initial reluctance is a small obstacle. The Soviets search for hegemony. Foreign aid is merely a vehicle for establishing a foothold. Once established—the aid officials become secondary instruments of policy and political officials move into the forefront. It is not surprising that Soviet administrators may attach little importance to traditional attitudes held by people in underdeveloped nations.

FORMULATION OF OBJECTIVES

Some candor is necessary in formulating specific objectives for United States aid and policy. Nations have been approached too often by other nations, competing for their goodwill, for them not to realize that the element of oppressive self-interest is the predominant one in the motivation of most nations who wish to establish "close" relationships with them.

ADMISSION OF MOTIVATION

Americans from the beginning have upheld and espoused the belief that each individual knows best what his own best interests are. As a nation we have always been loathe to admit that national acts in international economic, political, and social areas have been motivated by anything less than humanitarian feelings for the well-being of others. We become a little ashamed when we think that perhaps the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Truman Doctrine, Point Four proposals, and Mutual Security aid are motivated by our selfishness. We like our charity to be full fledged; for otherwise, it cannot be called charity.

Out of this attitude we have constructed a mythology that is hampering our full understanding of the nature of international tensions. We become embroiled in emotional discussions about what England, India, or some other nation owes us. Yet, in the competition of modern industry, we do depend upon other nations for raw materials and markets that help sustain the level of living achieved in the United States.

To maintain, and raise, that level of living requires sufficient self-interest to plan and act to bring about a world climate conducive to creative individual development *and* critical responsibility. Such a climate would represent mankind's highest aspiration. We cannot have such a condition for at least one generation, and shall not attain it then unless we began now to strengthen and improve our protestations of faith in the individual human being through detailed statements of objectives with every foreign act.

Mature self-interest is no object for shame. It does require the recognition that such interest may also motivate our neighbors. To negotiate successfully on this basis requires an unusual degree of candor, and intellectual integrity, that must be found and fostered to represent every nation at unilateral and multilateral conferences. This is one of the most difficult tasks that confronts us.

Legislation providing programs

An aid program aimed, at alleviating basic maladjustments within a nation, is a long-term affair. Its life must be consistent with the best judgment possible as to the length of time necessary to remedy the condition. No effective program can be achieved under any other arrangement without significant misuse of manpower and funds. Political malingering and temporary legislative provisions for aid programs that should be long-term in scope are not aimed to induce adequate personnel to accept appointment. In the same manner the provision of funds must be consistent within the framework of the best possible decision as to estimated annual costs. This would provide continuity of action and prevent sharp reduction of per-

sonnel one year and overloading in the succeeding year.

Short-sighted actions by Congress are themselves the result of irresponsible criticism and a lack of appreciation of individual personality by both legislative and administrative bodies. Viewed in terms of these conditions the foreign aid programs of the United States have made inefficient use of both manpower and money.

This is not to say that they have failed to secure certain areas against Communist penetration. That is a problem of national security and the programs have been of short-term usefulness at least, in that context. What we do mean is that for the amounts of aid that have been involved the returns to the U. S., in the form of economic, social, and political stability in those nations where aid has been extended, have been small. Would not the returns have been larger if we had acted, not out of fear of Soviet domination in these lands, but out of a desire to build a responsible *enterprise* system of cooperative economies throughout the world?

Aid Program in Europe

Although this paper deals with the problems of economic aid to the less-developed nations of the globe we can see similarities between them and European nations who have received aid. Under the aegis of attempting to establish a just and lasting peace the United States devised the European Recovery Program to prevent Communist subversion and penetration in Western Europe.[1] It was the object of E.R.P. to inhibit Communist success by measures aimed to raise levels of living.[2] Here we have an example of inadequate, poorly constructed planning and formulation of objectives. We have made the Communist approach to the peoples of Europe assume a dynamic appeal by relegating the Italian, French, Belgian, Greek or Turkish worker's level of living to a position of importance only insofar as it attains sufficient size to repulse Communist pressures.

In the E.R.P. the American interest in Europeans was not well enough formulated and expounded to express our national concern for the individual welfare of European workers. That, if anything, was of secondary importance. We thus opened the door to slanderous and questionable appraisals of our motives. Because of this, the E.R.P. gave aid and comfort to the Communists, and failed to make a maximum contribution to the joint unity of the nations receiving our aid.[3]

But we should realize that even long-term financial commitments and an adequate philosophic approach to the design of specific aid programs will not *ipso facto* assure their success. In the final analysis success will also be dependent upon the quality of personnel administering and working on the program, and upon our desire and ability to organize effectively all the factors involved in program operations. The record of the past leaves much to be desired in the future.

ATTACK ON CAUSE OR EFFECT

If low levels of living are effects variously of inadequate raw materials, poorly organized economic, political or social institutions, low educational and health levels and lack of technical knowledge and equipment, it is not possible permanently to raise the levels of living of a nation without first finding the specific cause or causes and making

[1] **Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies**, Gray Commission (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., November 10, 1950), p. 1.

[2] **Ibid.**

[3] A careful reading of the **Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies** and **Current Issues in Foreign Economic Assistance** (The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1951) as well as Congressional enabling legislation regulating the individual aid programs reveals the weaknesses described above.

the necessary adjustments. We may send raw materials to a nation lacking them and for a time incomes may rise, but if such shipments stop we should not be surprised if incomes drop to their former level.[4] United States aid planning must carefully consider whether, and for how long, we can assume such burdens and whether specific plans are consistent with overall long-term objectives.

Loans and grants made for purposes other than the eradication of causes of low income levels are difficult to justify even if labelled "expedient." We may, through assistance programs aimed at alleviating effects, temporarily improve conditions; but, with the cessation of such aid, the original condition reappears to haunt us and cause foreign recipients to gaze questioningly at the United States.

A hasty perusal of the success of nations in alleviating economic, political and social conditions in the last two hundred years supports the view that only in those nations where causes have been isolated and fearlessly attacked, has there appeared to be an increase in per capita real incomes and an appreciation of individual personality development and critical responsibility.

Poverty is relative for each age and is not comparable between ages. It has been said that low income residents of the United States in 1961 have more physical conveniences than did ancient kings. This is unimportant except as a measurement of productive progress. The low income receivers of present day society are low only in comparison to what others are now receiving.

Tremendous pressure exists among low income receivers to better their situation. The desire to move upward on the income scale is consistent with our ideal of progress so long as regard for personality development and critical responsibility remains inviolate and, indeed, increases. Increased material possessions *per se* are not enough; they must contribute to social development through the improvement of value judgments.

Let us admit, then, that differences in income levels among the people of one nation and between nations do, and will continue, to exist. Nations with large resource bases, highly developed economic institutions and technical arts and sciences, and highly trained and able populations will have higher per capita incomes than those nations not so well provided. As a nation uses up its physical resources it *may* continue to have the same, or greater, per capita incomes than previously if education and technological processes are creating new and better ways of utilizing diminishing physical resources.

It is here that the ideal of critical responsibility becomes important. Young people trained to critical appraisal are likely to become middle-aged members of society with responsible ideas. Their ideas will be relevant to the time in which they live and can be used in the solution of problems brought on by changing relationships between the physical and human universes. By solving such problems the ideal of individual personality is not only left undamaged—it is strengthened. Temporary aid, and we do not mean interim aid here, used to alleviate effects rather than causes is wasteful.

Since 1954, participation by the Sino-Soviet countries in extending aid to less-developed countries has been increasing rapidly. Although the United States currently extends larger dollar amounts of aid, the differences between U. S. aid and Bloc aid are becoming continually smaller. The result has been a significant impact on the countries receiving economic aid, and an

[4] This statement assumes no change in population, internal resource base, technological conditions or educational level during the period of the aid.

increase in the *economic competition* between the United States and the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Because of this increasing competition, there is a serious danger that the U. S. will now embark on a money-matching game with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This would be disastrous. The Bloc uses foreign aid programs to destroy political unity in recipient nations. We claim to use economic aid as a device to increase the stability of the economies of recipient nations—a much more difficult task. But, unless it is done expertly we shall be defeated in the competition for the support of the underdeveloped areas.

OBJECTIVES OF BLOC AID

To understand fully the nature of Bloc assistance, it is first necessary to examine the objectives of Soviet foreign aid. There is a clear distinction between the ultimate and immediate objectives, both of which are important in the determination of Bloc policy.

Economic assistance to be less-developed nations is part of an integrated plan to strengthen total Soviet influence in these countries. The integral plan is one designed to increase Soviet power to the extent of precipitating the anti-capitalist "revolution" which is supposed to come eventually to all countries.

In an effort to bring about the revolution, Soviet powers encourage the development of local non-Communist governments; or, as the Soviets call them, "national bourgeois states." Although this appears to be paradoxical, the intention is to speed up the class struggle and thereby to bring about the revolution more rapidly. This movement through the capitalistic phase may be encouraged by providing economic assistance to countries believed to be most susceptible to this type of political and economic change.

At the same time, the administration of economic assistance can be conducted so as to increase anti-Western feelings, and replace possible favorable tendencies with ideas more amenable to increasing Soviet power. The intangible influence of providing Soviet aid is believed by the Soviets to be extremely important in accomplishing their purposes. As will be indicated in a later section, the psychological effects of Soviet aid have been of great significance.[5]

In some areas, there is a trend toward "state socialist" patterns of organization. Africa is a good example. Where these patterns exist, Soviet aid is apparently introduced in the hope that the capitalist phase of development may be by-passed.[6]

One of the important purposes of Sino-Soviet economic aid is that of promoting prestige by showing that Bloc countries, most of which were once underdeveloped areas, have been able to develop through Communism. This provides an example for underdeveloped countries to follow. The United States does not have this psychological advantage; not having been an underdeveloped country, the United States finds it difficult to set herself apart as an example of the successes to be enjoyed through capitalism.

Another immediate objective is that of promoting the "cold war." By making new sources of aid available to these countries, the Soviet Bloc hopes to cause recipient countries to be more demanding with Western nations. This may tend to increase tensions between Western countries and less-developed, neutral countries.

Countries are urged to take advantage of Soviet aid because the acceptance of such aid is likely to have the effect of increasing

[5] U. S. Department of State, "The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive Through 1960," Intelligence Report No. 8426, March 21, 1961, pp. 6-8.

[6] U. S. Department of State, **Communist Economic Policy in the Less-Developed Areas,** Publication No. 7020, July, 1960, pp. 10-11.

Western assistance even more. This encourages a still higher degree of economic competition, and the possibility of countries breaking with the West is increased.[7]

Soviet Bloc aid is made to appear to be the only source of aid which insures neutrality and independence for receiving countries. Paradoxically, this allows the Soviet Bloc eventually to gain political entry into more and more nations.

These are the general objectives of Sino-Soviet aid. In addition there are several purposes behind aid coming from Communist China and the European satellites in particular. Communist China is politically motivated to gain recognition and prestige, even at the expense of badly-needed internal economic development. The European satellites, in addition to political motives, hope to find sources from which to import the large quantity of goods which cannot be produced by the satellite nations themselves.

DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET AID

In 1949 and part of 1950, the major aspect of Soviet policy toward less-developed areas was one of intense militancy. Open military aggression was the main characteristic of Soviet policy. Beginning in 1950, the emphasis on military aggression was diminished. In the mid-1955 years, the policy of supporting non-Communist governments in an attempt to further anti-Western sentiments was begun. It is in this context that economic assistance was undertaken to help accomplish the ultimate objectives of Soviet political policy.[8]

The amount of aid extended is not measured in terms of purely economic costs. The total contribution of economic aid to overall policy objectives is apparently the main criterion by which the benefits of Soviet assistance programs are assessed.

Table I shows the amounts of economic credits and grants extended to less-developed countries by the Sino-Soviet Bloc and by the United States, from 1954 through 1960. As shown in this table, the trend is clearly toward an increasing proportion of Soviet aid, in comparison with United States aid. In 1959 and 1960, United States aid was not much greater than Sino-Soviet aid. The prospect of continuing increases in Soviet aid relative to U. S. aid is part of the problem which alarms many people in the West.

It is believed that approximately 80 per cent of total Sino-Soviet aid originates in the U.S.S.R. No precise estimates are available on the proportions of the remaining 20 per cent originating in Red China and in the European satellites.

Types of economic aid

The most common type of Sino-Soviet Bloc assistance is interest-bearing credit for a specific project. Very few grants are currently given by the Soviet Bloc. An advantage derived from this type of assistance is that recipient countries feel that the assistance is more of a business deal, with no "strings" attached. This is in contrast to the many grants extended by the United States, often with "strings" of one kind or another attached.

An additional advantage to the donor country is that credits are less costly to administer, and more easily limited without "hurt feelings" and hence possible political repercussions. Extensive use of credits also gives the Soviets a method of keeping in close contact with recipient countries.

In general, the U.S.S.R. acts as a "prime contractor" and provides general lines of credit. The satellite countries act as "subcontractors" and are more often involved in smaller projects for rapid completion.

[7] Ibid., p. 9.
[8] U. S. Department of State, "The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive Through 1960," op. cit., pp. 1-3.

TABLE I

COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC AID TO LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES*

By Sino-Soviet Bloc and United States

(Millions of U. S. Dollars)

Year	Total Aid U.S. and Bloc	United States Aid	% of Total	Sino-Soviet Bloc Aid	% of Total
1954†	$ 752	$ 741	98.5%	$ 11	1.5%
1955	606	457	75.4	149	24.6
1956	1,470	862	58.7	608	41.3
1957	1,156	929	80.4	227	19.6
1958	1,966	1,410	71.7	556	28.3
1959	1,836	942	51.3	894	48.7
1960	2,652	1,487	56.1	1,165	43.9
TOTAL	$10,438	$6,828	65.4%	$3,610	34.6%

*Same countries as those listed in Table II.

†Sino-Soviet statistics are for year ended December 31. U. S. statistics are for year ended June 30 (i.e. fiscal year 1954, etc.)

Source: U. S. State Department and International Cooperation Administration.

Interest rates on Soviet credits are generally between 2 and 2½ per cent. These low rates, motivated largely by political objectives, are quite attractive to less-developed countries.

The Soviet Bloc accepts commodities in repayment of credits. Most agreements provide for repayment in annual installments over a period of 12 years. The commodities acceptable for repayment are negotiated annually. These negotiations also help to maintain contacts between Soviet countries and recipients.[9]

Many completed projects in less-developed areas have been executed through use of this type of Soviet credit. Examples of such completed projects include a tire factory in Indonesia, built with Czech aid; a steel mill in India, built with U.S.S.R. credits; a Russian-built silo in Afghanistan; and a sugar plant in Indonesia constructed with assistance from East Germany.

[9] U. S. Department of State, **Communist Economic Policy in the Less-Developed Areas, op. cit.,** pp. 15-16.

Targets for economic aid

Table II provides comparisons of Sino-Soviet Bloc aid with United States aid in the 1950's. As seen in the table, Soviet aid is rather highly concentrated, with over 60 per cent in this period having gone to the three countries of India, the United Arab Republic, and Indonesia.

United States aid, although somewhat concentrated, is generally more diverse than is Sino-Soviet aid. Slightly over 70 per cent of United States total aid during this period went to Brazil, Pakistan, Turkey, India, and Yugoslavia. India is the only country which received substantial assistance from both the Bloc and the U. S. A.

Iran, Turkey, and Iceland are good examples of pro-Western countries that have accepted aid from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. None of these three, however, received large amounts of Soviet aid as compared to U. S. aid.

The Sino-Soviet Bloc offers almost as much aid, as does the United States, in Africa and Asia. The U. S. renders con-

TABLE II

COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC AID TO LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

By Sino-Soviet Bloc and United States
(Millions of U. S. Dollars)

	United States	Sino-Soviet Bloc
Area and Country	July 53-June 60	Jan. 54-Dec. 60
Latin America	*$1,403*	*$ 322*
Argentina	349	104
Brazil	1,026	3
Cuba	28	215
Middle East	*2,457*	*1,385*
Afghanistan	106	217
Iran	475	6
Iraq	19	315
Pakistan	932	3
Turkey	774	17
United Arab Republic	146	783
Yemen	5	44
Africa	*290*	*279*
Ethiopia	60	114
Ghana	3	50
Guinea	2	107
Morocco	114	0
Sudan	31	0
Tunisia	80	8
Asia	*1,826*	*1,608*
Burma	83	12
Cambodia	173	55
Ceylon	50	58
India	1,304	933
Indonesia	201	509
Nepal	15	41
Europe	*852*	*16*
Iceland	28	5
Yugoslavia	824	11
TOTAL	$6,828	$3,610

Source: U. S. State Department and International Cooperation Administration.

siderably more aid to less-developed areas in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East, as compared to the Soviet Bloc.

The target countries for economic aid are rather clearly defined, with the exception of India. Other areas which do not presently receive significant amounts of aid from either the Bloc or the United States may, in the future, become subject to more intense competition between the two powers.

TYPES OF BLOC AID

The terms upon which Soviet aid is made available provide several advantages for borrowing countries. Their pride is not offended by accepting handouts. Low interest

rates and the possibility of commodity repayment are further advantages.

Political

The greatest impact of Soviet aid has not been the dollar amounts of aid, nor has it been the improvements brought about by the assistance. The psychological and propaganda impact are the greatest successes of the Soviet economic offensive.[10]

As indicated earlier, the experiences of Western countries (particularly the United States) do not seem relevant to underdeveloped countries. Both the U.S.S.R. and Red China, on the other hand, have been in the "underdeveloped" category but are presently showing how *their system* can more easily and more rapidly bring about economic development.

Gradualist policies, associated with capitalistic development, do not appeal to those in power in underdeveloped countries. Democracy, as a value, does not appeal to these leaders; totalitarianism is believed to be essential for progress. Rapid changes involving the entire political-social-economic mileu are required to bring about the necessary break with the past. Some form of socialism is clearly the answer they seek. The Sino-Soviet Bloc has taken every opportunity to advance this type of thinking; participation in economic assistance programs has become a major part of this policy.

Bloc countries are then able to establish themselves as the "brothers" of underdeveloped countries in their struggle against the "imperialist" West. In this context, the Soviet Union has been able to convince many countries that the Bloc is the only outside power capable of offering "disinterested" help.[11]

[10] Cf. Alec Nove, **Communist Economic Strategy,** National Planning Association, 1959, pp. 50-53.

[11] Franklin A. Lindsay, **The Growth of Soviet Economic Power,** National Planning Association of the U.S.A. and the Private Planning Association of Canada, 1959, p. 12.

Perhaps the most serious dilemma faced by the United States is the possibility that socialism may in fact be more conducive to providing *rapid economic growth* than is capitalism. If this is so, then the Sino-Soviet Bloc has an advantage which outweighs economic weapons possessed by the United States.

There are, however, some disadvantages associated with Soviet aid. In undertaking a Bloc financed project, part of the outlay and all of the repayment must come from hard-pressed domestic sources. Inflation may become a serious problem.

Acceptance of Soviet aid sometimes causes recipient countries to become dependent on the Bloc for materials with which to carry out projects. Such materials are often limited in supply, and apparently the Bloc has not been an entirely dependable source.

This dependency may carry over into the more distant future by making recipient countries dependent on the Soviet Union for replacement parts. Also, the Soviets may be able to gain increased political leverage as a result of this increased dependency.

Repayment in commodities may force a country to give up its ability to sell goods in free world markets. As a result, lower prices may be forced on these countries.

It is conceivable that the Soviets could later convert a credit to a grant in order to gain further political advantage.[12] This may also cause recipient countries to forego a certain amount of political independence in that such conversions would create intangible obligations.

In general, the acecptance of Soviet aid causes a country to give up a certain amount of economic, and in many cases political, freedom. However, the advantages apparently outweigh the disadvantages, and the impact of Soviet aid continues to in-

[12] Ibid.

crease in many neutral, less-developed countries.[13]

Technical aid

Both the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the United States send a sizable number of technicians to less-developed areas. Technical personnel have an important role in that many of the inhabitants of a particular area pass judgment on the two major powers according to the actions of the technicians.

Soviet technicians are concentrated in India, Afghanistan, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen. These four countries contain about 80 per cent of total Bloc economic technicians.

In 1959 there were over 6,500 Bloc technicians spending one month or more in selected underdeveloped countries. This represents an increase of more than 2,000 over the previous year. Two thirds of these technicians are from the U.S.S.R.

Meaningful estimates of United States personnel are not readily available.[14] It is believed that Soviet personnel outnumber U. S. personnel in the near East and in Southern Asia by about 2½ to 1. The most significant point, however, is the rapid increase in the number of Soviet technicians.

Soviet technicians are not sent to these countries to be subversives. Apparently their only purpose is a technical one. Their influence over local people is nonetheless increasing as more and more are sent to less-developed areas.[15]

[13] U. S. Department of State, "The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive Through 1960," **op. cit.**, p. 16.

[14] Although some estimates of U. S. personnel in less-developed countries are available, such estimates do not reflect the **total** number of U. S. persons involved in rendering technical assistance. Many of the available statistics are confusing, and it is difficult to determine exactly what they mean.

[15] U. S. Department of State, "A Comparison of U. S. and Soviet Bloc Aid Personnel in Less-Developed Countries," Mimeo material, December 31, 1960.

THE TRADE DRIVE

In addition to increasing economic assistance programs, there has been an increasing trade drive between the Sino-Soviet Bloc and less-developed countries. Table III shows that in the four year period between 1954 and 1958, Bloc trade with underdeveloped countries increased 144.1 per cent. In 1958, the Bloc accounted for more than 10 per cent of the total trade of eight less-developed countries: Afghanistan, Greece, Egypt, Iceland, Syria, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Uruguay.

Egypt is an especially interesting case. In 1955, 15 per cent of Egypt's total trade was with Bloc countries; in 1956, 23 per cent was with Bloc countries; and in 1958, 38 per cent of Egypt's total trade turnover was with Bloc countries.

At the end of 1958, there were approximately 174 trade agreements between the Soviet Bloc and less-developed areas. By the end of 1960, 206 Bloc agreements with 32 different countries were in effect.[16] It is clear that the Sino-Soviet Bloc intends to continue increasing these agreements to include as many neutral countries as possible.

The appeal for trade is similar to the appeal for accepting Soviet credits—largely one couched in terms of brotherhood, independence, development, and impartiality.

Such bilateral deals may have the effect of cutting off traditional markets, thus causing the underdeveloped countries to lose a part of their economic independence. In some cases, bilateral trade agreements with Soviet countries have resulted in adverse terms of trade for the less-developed countries. Such disadvantages, however, do not seriously hamper the progress being made by the Bloc in significantly expanding trade with these countries. Increased trade, like increased assistance, gives the

[16] U. S. State Department, "The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive Through 1960," **op. cit.**, p. 30.

TABLE III

TOTAL TRADE TURNOVER

Sino-Soviet Bloc and Less-Developed Countries*

(Millions of U. S. Dollars)

	1954	1958	Per Cent Increase
Sino-Soviet Bloc			
U.S.S.R.	$215	$ 676	214.4%
European Satellites	438	1,036	136.5
Communist China	216	409	89.4
TOTAL	$869	$2,121	144.1%

*In addition to those countries listed in Table II, these figures include Greece, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaya and Singapore, Thailand, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Portugal, and Spain.

Source: U. S. State Department.

Bloc another channel through which to influence the political activities of these neutral areas.[17]

CONCLUSION

Quite apart from the amounts of economic assistance and trade, the greatest impact of Sino-Soviet Bloc activity is the psychological effect on less-developed nations. The Soviet "natural advantage" of having once been an underdeveloped country is of considerable significance.

In spite of certain limitations and possible disadvantages attached to Soviet aid, this impact has continued to become greater. There is little doubt as to the ability of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to continue increasing its aid. As it does, this psychological impact may become still more significant.

The critical question confronting the United States is partly one of how much foreign aid, to whom, and under what conditions it should be granted. But even more important for United States *policy* is the dilemma posed by the socialistic beliefs of the leaders of many less-developed countries.

If the United States is to compete effectively with the Sino-Soviet Bloc to ally these nations, then some basis for "psychological" or "idealogical" competition must be found. Such a basis does not presently exist.

The fact that the United States itself believes in the soundness of its own ways is not enough. Until an effective method of idealogical competition is found, the course of foreign policy will continue to suffer blows from which it may not recover.

[17] U. S. State Department, **Communist Economic Policy in the Less-Developed Areas, op. cit.,** pp. 20-24 discuss the trade drive.

The House Committee On Rules

Adapted from address
Midwest Political Science Assn.
at University of Missouri

RICHARD BOLLING
Member U. S. Congress
5th District, Missouri

Within one month following the opening of the 87th Congress, the House of Representatives concluded one of the most important and dramatic battles since George Norris led the progressive coup against "Uncle Joe" Cannon in 1910.

By the narrow margin of five votes, 217-212, Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn—operating with the blessing of President Kennedy and his ten-day old administration—defeated the Republican-Southern Democratic coalition on a resolution to enlarge the Committee on Rules from twelve to fifteen members. With this victory, twenty-odd years of the coalition's domination of the most powerful committee of the House had ended.

MEANING OF VICTORY

This battle was important for several reasons. First, and most obviously, it represented the first major legislative victory for the fledgling administration in circumstances where a defeat would have been highly embarrassing.

Second, the addition of two Democrats and one Republican to the Committee offset the alliance among Republicans and Southern Democrats. Many times during the past two decades this alliance had been able to defy the House leadership by keeping priority legislation from the floor, or by forcing the leadership to use cumbersome and unreliable parliamentary maneuvers to circumvent the blockaded Committee. The Kennedy administration could now reasonably expect House consideration of the major items in its legislative program.

Finally, but least obviously, this victory also brought forward a challenge of far wider dimensions. While the Rules Committee win meant priority legislation would reach the floor, this fact said nothing about the legislation's eventual passage.

The Republican-Southern Democratic coalition that originally constructed the Committee on Rules as a prominent obstacle in the legislative process during Franklin Roosevelt's second term had not been destroyed. In other words, while the administration had cured one symptom of that common legislative malady, infectious obstructionism, the disease itself—as viewed from a partisan perspective—remained strong, active, and contagious. This greater challenge is the need to effect a more lasting cure.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In order to understand fully the impact of the enlarged Committee on Rules on the legislative process, and—more particularly—its relation to the legislative plans of the Kennedy administration, this recent encounter between Speaker Rayburn and Chairman Howard W. Smith of Virginia

must be set in its broader historical perspective.

Although the House always has had a Committee on Rules, for the first 90 years it wielded little influence over either the substance of legislation or the order of its consideration. Its primary responsibility was to report a code of rules at the beginning of each Congress and it seldom met after that duty had been accomplished. From 1841 to 1883, through gradual accretions of power, the Committee secured the exclusive right to report special orders providing times and methods for the consideration of special bills. This was considered to be a great liberalizing reform; it enabled a majority of the House to bring legislation to the floor through a Committee on Rules resolution, instead of being forced to rely on unanimous consent or a two-thirds vote to suspend the rules. A powerful new weapon for the construction of a legislative program had been created by the majority party.

Under the guidance of Speakers Reed and Cannon—sitting as ex-officio chairmen—the Committee assumed its present authority of determining which bills shall have the right-of-way to consideration on the floor and of specifying the duration and character of the floor debate. During this period, the House, in fact, largely delegated to the Committee the power to regulate procedures vested in itself by the Constitution. In sum, the Committee on Rules, during the latter half of the 19th century, experienced a remarkable transformation from one of the most ineffectual House committees to its most powerful.

The 20th century brought several attempts to restrict, or at least circumvent, the Committee's newly acquired authority. In 1909 the procedure of Calendar Wednesday was established, whereby each Wednesday was set aside exclusively for the chairmen on the standing committees to call up bills and resolutions not otherwise privileged. This procedure soon fell into disuse except on extraordinary occasions.

In 1910, as a result of the Norris revolt, the Speaker lost his seat on the Committee and its membership was enlarged from five to eleven. Also in 1910, the House adopted a discharge rule which permitted the discharge of legislation from any standing committee by means of a petition signed by a certain number of members. This number has varied widely through the years. The current requirement is a majority of the total membership of the House.

In 1924 the Chairman was prevented from *arbitrarily* holding—often in his suitcoat pocket—resolutions which the Committee had passed and authorized him to report to the full House. But the most fundamental change in the Committee's power occurred when the 81st Congress adopted the controversial 21-day rule. This rule permitted the immediate consideration of legislation reported by a standing committee which had been before the Committee on Rules for 21 days without receiving clearance to the House floor. The 82nd Congress, however, abandoned this innovation and the Committee recovered its original powers.

Despite the adoption of these various procedures to circumvent the Committee on Rules, the Committee retains great authority today. The tremendous effort required to bring legislation to the floor, without a rule from the Committee on Rules, limits the use of these alternative procedures to the most critical situations.

ROLE OF COMMITTEE

A continuing debate heard both on the House floor and among political scientists concerns the proper role of the Committee on Rules. One side of this debate has acquired the somewhat colloquial label of the "traffic cop school." Rep. Gerald Flynn

(Dem., Wis.) stated this position during a debate last session:

> **It is only fitting and proper that this body should have a Rules Committee, a Rules Committee designed to direct the orderly flow of legislation onto this floor in order that consideration can be given to all bills coming before it offered by Members of this body. It is no different than the traffic cop that the police force has stationed at a busy corner downtown. It is the function of the traffic cop not to confiscate the car that you ride in, not to set up a blockade so you cannot go through, but to direct the traffic so that you and the others may pass in an orderly manner and reach your destination.** (Congressional Record, **86th Congress, 2nd Session, August 26, 1960, p. 16698.)**

The motive behind this argument is the preservation of a non-differentiating democratic procedure in the House, *i.e.*, every bill, regardless of its content, must come before the House for consideration if it is approved by a standing committee. The 21-day rule was the foremost attempt to put this theory into operation.

No traffic cop

However, historical investigation reveals that, with the exception of the 81st Congress and its 21-day rule, neither the proposed nor the actual functioning of the Committee on Rules ever resembled a "traffic cop on the corner."

The Committee was specifically designed to function as the responsible agent of the majority party, using its great discretionary authority over pending legislation to facilitate the consideration and adoption of the majority party's program. In doing this, the Committee has necessarily considered the substance of legislation, occasionally blocking bad legislation that the substantive committees were unable, or unwilling, to kill and that would likewise go unopposed on the floor. However, members of the Committee on Rules—usually holding relatively secure seats—are uniquely able to conduct this secondary review. The Committee's power to grant or withhold rules is obviously essential to this safety-valve operation.

But on matters of high legislative priority —the major elements of the administration's or the majority party's program—a majority of the Committee members have also traditionally deferred their judgment to the will of the majority party as expressed through its elected leadership. Difficulties have arisen, particularly between 1937 and 1961, when the Committee failed to reflect the party's position on certain priority matters. And this, of course, ultimately stemmed from the power structure within Congress, not the ability of the Committee to do more than fill out legislative timetables.

Majority party's agent

As suggested earlier, it is necessary to appreciate the equivocal nature of Speaker Rayburn's victory over Judge Smith. The battle, waged to restore the Committee's traditional role of functioning as agent of the majority party, left relatively unscathed the foundations of the Republican-Southern Democratic coalition which originally wrested control of the Committee from the Democratic leadership in 1937. (This bipartisan control of the Committee was maintained until the current session, except for the 80th Congress, 1947-48, when the Committee briefly functioned in its traditional fashion, reflecting the vehement Republican opposition to President Truman's Fair Deal domestic legislation.)

The depth and solidity of the conservative coalition's foundations in the House is a *massive political fact* frequently overlooked. The 1937 coup within the Committee merely preceded the highly significant shift in positions which occurred between the House and Senate in 1939.

Whereas the Senate traditionally had functioned as the greater obstructionist in

the legislative process—both in theory and in practice—the House dramatically claimed this distinction during the first session of the 76th Congress. This change of posture between the Senate and the House, coupled with the earlier transformation of the Rules Committee from agent to opponent of the majority party, bears directly on the overall political situation currently facing the Kennedy administration.

The great momentum which Roosevelt carried from the 1936 landslide into the first session of the 75th Congress (1937) was largely dissipated in his ensuing struggle over the enlargement of the Supreme Court. The conservative leaders in Congress, having unexpectedly been handed this issue, about which to regroup their depleted and dispirited forces, and, even more unexpectedly, having actually defeated the colossus on Pennsylvania Avenue, maintained their offensive against the Roosevelt program. The administration never was able to mount an effective counter-offensive.

Change in 1937

In August 1937, the New Deal lost control of the Committee on Rules when three of its Democratic members joined with four Republicans to block the administration's wage-hour bill. In December the House recommitted the wage-hour bill after it passed the Senate. After a long and bitter fight, the House in April 1938 recommitted Roosevelt's executive reorganization bill by a narrow margin.

Both Houses rejected administration theories of taxation and sent the President a revenue bill which became law without his signature. Congress also left for future action numerous legislative projects recommended by the President. But these reverses, as disturbing as they seemed, were mere portents of the disastrous 76th Congress (1939-40).

Stung by the legislative failures of 1937 and 1938, and blaming a number of conservative Democrats, Roosevelt made his ill-fated attempt to purge these dissident elements in the 1938 congressional elections and primaries. Most of the Democrats opposed by Roosevelt won, and, moreover, the Republicans—rebounding from 1936—nearly doubled their strength in the House and picked up eight seats in the Senate.

Needing little encouragement in the first place, but receiving a great deal from the election returns, the Republican-Southern Democratic coalition moved vigorously to the attack in 1939, particularly in the House. Perhaps the outstanding administration defeat of the session was the House's refusal to consider the administration's lending-for-recovery program. Similarly the House refused consideration of the administration's housing bill, voted to investigate the NLRB over energetic administration objections, passed the anti-New Deal Hatch Act, defeated the farm parity payments bill, and voted to eliminate the Guam naval base. The President's leadership on the neutrality issue also was rejected by the House, with the mangled remains of the administration's bill finally passing by a narrow margin.

Meanwhile the Senate—in a striking reversal of form—was largely supporting the major elements of the administration's program, passing such measures as the government reorganization plan, the lending program, social security revisions, the omnibus transportation bill and farm parity payments.

Both the capture of the Rules Committee by the Republican-Southern Democratic alliance within the Committee and the subsequent defeats suffered by Roosevelt in the House reflected an indisputable political fact; the impressive strength of the bipartisan coalition of Republican and Southern Democratic conservatives.

COMMITTEE BLOCKADES

Lacking the guiding hand of the majority leadership, the nearly *absolute* power of the Committee on Rules to control the business of the House proved to be a highly corrupting factor in the legislative process. Most routine legislation passed through the Committee without incident, but measures of high priority containing controversial social or economic provisions were almost always in trouble.

Looking at just the last five Congresses—the 82nd through the 86th—there are many instances of the Committee smothering or significantly altering legislation under both Democratic and Republican majority leadership.

In the 82nd Congress, the Committee refused to act on a bill granting two million tons of grain to famine-ridden India, despite the urgent pleas of President Truman. Three months later, after the bill had been amended to provide for sale of the grain, the Committee granted clearance.

In the 83rd Congress, the Committee killed the Hawaii-Alaska statehood bill by

"PLAY BALL!"
Courtesy St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Cartoon published December 30, 1960

tabling the pending rule to send the bill to conference.

During the 84th Congress, the Committee forced deletion of provisions in bills dealing with small businesses, the polio vaccine, and the doctors' draft before granting rules. It delayed action on federal aid to education and civil rights, until the bills were abandoned in the closing adjournment rush; and it completely denied a rule for a depressed areas bill.

In the 85th Congress, the Committee refused to pass the Alaska statehood bill, although it finally reached the floor under a special privilege granted statehood bills by the Rules of the House; the Hawaii bill never was cleared by the Committee and it never reached the floor. A measure providing for $750 million TVA bonds died in the Committee and the $2.5 billion housing bill passed by the Senate received similar treatment. The 1957 civil rights bill finally passed only after members literally took over control of the Committee from Judge Smith and independently convened the Committee so it could act on the bill.

Obstructing Legislation

These illustrations suggest the extent to which the Committee on Rules had become a maddening thorn in the side of the Democratic leadership, blocking and obstructing legislation on a number of crucial occasions. Not surprisingly, demands to strip the Committee of all substantive authority were regularly voiced by many members and observers of Congress. Once the Committee had been struck down, so the argument ran, and relegated to filling out legislative timetables, this strong-point of conservative power would be short-circuited with Congress again attending to legislation in a more responsible pattern.

Perhaps so, but House rules and procedures have the strange propensity of reflecting quite accurately the attitudes of the House members. Reforms which lack substantial broad-based support, however desirable or necessary on other terms, either do not last or, more likely, are simply ignored. (The disuse of the Calendar Wednesday procedure is a good illustration.)

Following the abortive 21-day rule experiment in the 81st Congress—a major reform which never won acceptance—little action against the Committee was contemplated for one major reason. Although the House was nominally controlled by Northern Democrats or Eisenhower Republicans, it fundamentally reflected the same posture of obstruction acquired during Roosevelt's second term. In this context, the fact of possessing a viable majority on a particular vote, or even a series of votes, did not provide the basis for additional tampering with the jewel in the crown of the Republican-Southern Democratic coalition. Many members willing to support the leadership on a floor vote would have unhesitatingly rebelled against a purge of the Committee, particularly if Judge Smith or the next ranking Democrat, Representative William Colmer of Mississippi, were involved.

Policy issues

In addition, the existence of a Republican President made the move seem less than urgent to the Democratic leadership. Since the *initiative* for policy lay with the executive, it did not, on balance, seem sufficiently profitable to undergo the great internal stresses which would result from an attempt to invigorate the Democratic policy machinery through a revamping of the Committee on Rules. However, offense piled upon offense and frustration met with frustration during these years.

The lack of Presidential initiative in certain areas shifted the burden of policy formation more and more to the nominally Democratic Congress. Finally, a series of

events in the 86th Congress put the argument for reform in terms most understandable to congressmen, *i.e.*, those of political survival.

With both parties fashioning their weapons for the Presidential election the Democratic leadership's inability to control the Committee on Rules seriously blunted the record of legislative accomplishment which the party was striving to build. For example, the area redevelopment bill passed the Senate in 1959, but the Committee refused to report the House version. Through the almost forgotten procedures of Calendar Wednesday, the bill finally reached the floor in May 1960 and passed after many procedural roll calls.

In June 1960 a discharge petition was used to circumvent the Committee and bring the Federal pay-raise bill to the floor for approval. The threat of a discharge petition finally forced Committee action on the 1960 civil rights bill.

The threat of Calendar Wednesday prodded the Committee into clearing the school construction bill, although the Republican-Southern Democratic alliance within the Committee ultimately blocked the bill by refusing to report a resolution sending it to conference. These parliamentary gymnastics convincingly demonstrated the travesty of a Rules Committee continuing under bipartisan conservative control, particularly if the November election produced a Democratic President and Congress.

REFORM OF COMMITTEE

The Kennedy victory supplied the final, but most essential, ingredient in the formula for effective reform—the inescapable necessity for the Democratic Party in Congress to produce. Despite the loss of more than 20 Democratic seats in November, the overwhelming significance of this fact provided an impetus to action which had never existed under even larger Democratic House majorities. Moreover, the assurance of Presidential interest and support increased the liklihood of success.

Party interest

The fundamental objective of any reform of the Rules Committee was clear: a return to its traditional function as responsible agent of the majority party. The alliance between the four Republican members and two Southern Democrats, Judge Smith and Colmer, deadlocked the 12-man committee in a six-six tie on most controversial issues. Either the removal of one Southern Democrat or the enlargement of the total membership would break this deadlock, giving the regular Democrats a narrow majority.

Since Colmer openly opposed President Kennedy during the Presidential campaign, some persons urged his removal from the Committee on the grounds of party disloyalty. Speaker Rayburn, however, decided the fundamental objective could be accomplished just as effectively, with considerably less internal strife, by enlarging the membership by three—two Democrats and one Republican—thereby creating an eight to seven majority of regular Democrats. Rayburn described this procedure as "painless," commenting further, "It is a way to embarrass no one, unless they want to be embarrassed." On January 18, 1961, the Democratic caucus approved Rayburn's plan.

The Republicans were visibly, if somewhat unevenly, split over their proper response to Rayburn's proposal. About 20 Republicans, led by Representative Tom Curtis of Missouri, strongly spoke out against openly aligning with Southern Democrats in opposing Rayburn. On January 1, 1961, Curtis and five northern Republican colleagues had issued a statement of policy, declaring in part:

. . . we repudiate any suggestion of a coalition with Southern Democrats or anyone else, based on opposition either to civil rights or to other constructive legislation . . . To attempt to narrow the base of our party, to dull its conscience, to transform it into a negative weapon of obstruction can only succeed in projecting an image which has consistently been rejected by the Republican party and the American people.

Curtis appealed personally to Minority Leader Halleck to permit Rayburn's plan to pass unopposed, thereby "putting the Democratic party on the spot" regarding the subsequent passage of legislation. But Halleck, with the solid backing of Representative Clarence Brown of Ohio, ranking member of the Rules Committee, ignored these pleas. On January 19 the Republican party conference voted overwhelmingly to oppose the plan to enlarge the Committee.

Republican opposition

The Republican decision to oppose, carrying with it the implied willingness to collaborate openly with the Southern Democratic forces, led to the hotly contested battle decided on January 31 in Rayburn's favor. An examination of the result discloses that 195 Democrats joined with 22 Republicans to defeat 148 Republicans and 64 Southern Democrats.

The magnitude of this victory can be better appreciated by realizing that Republicans and Southern Democrats (including border states of the Confederacy) held 285 of the 435 House seats occupied at that time. Substantial southern support for the Rayburn move came from Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. These votes, added to the knot of Republican rebels, gave Rayburn enough strength to offset the majority of Republicans and Southern Democrats aligned against him.

Undoubtedly the feeling of personal obligation toward the Speaker picked up some Southern Democratic votes, particularly when this feeling was bolstered by the added responsibility to support the Kennedy administration in its first major test of strength. Likewise the political wisdom of adopting this course should not be discounted.

The election of Representative Carl Elliott of Alabama and Representative B. F. Sisk of California to fill the new Democratic seats on the Committee assured approval of most of the administration's priority legislation. The Committee on Rules—after years of wandering in the wilderness of conservative obstruction—had returned home, a battered but warmly welcomed prodigal.

This return represented a *great victory* for the Speaker and the President. But even though the bipartisan conservative coalition lost on this specific issue it retains enough strength in the House of Representatives to make that body a more hazardous course for the passage of legislation than the Senate. Civil rights is a major exception to this rule.

This simply means that few parts of the Kennedy program will pass the House without much hard work by administration supporters and the President himself. Some measures, such as medical care for the aged, may suffer temporary—or even permanent—defeat.

New coalition

In fact, the Rules Committee victory and the work which still remains cannot be fully understood until they are viewed as one aspect in an overall challenge facing President Kennedy: the need to bring alive in this nation a politically effective majority to replace the outworn Roosevelt coalition of farmers, workers, intellectuals, and ethnic and racial minorities. This new Kennedy coalition—through a committment to the objectives of his administration—must

be made ready to bring its *political power* to bear upon those persons who implement the President's program, principally the Congress.

Currently it is commonplace to observe that a viable majority of these dimensions does not yet exist in this country, even though the President's personal popularity remains high. In such an atmosphere, the Republican-Southern Democratic coalition remains a potent political force, regardless of the Rules Committee victory.

CONCLUSION

However, the victory does represent a vital first step in the building of a Kennedy *coalition*. The way has now been cleared for consideration and passage of the backlog of unfinished business which accumulated during the past eight years.

Nothing in the current Kennedy program is new in the sense of what Roosevelt sought during the first and second New Deals. All of the pending bills are based on previously accepted concepts and precedents.

In fact:

— an expanded wage-hour law
— a comprehensive plan for area redevelopment
— medical insurance financed by social security
— an adequate housing program
— federal assistance for the nation's schools

represent merely a minimum effort to deal *responsibly* with the problems arising from a constantly growing population, revolutionary technological progress, expanding urban centers, and the challenge of international communism. If approved, these programs would only represent a reaffirmation of the spirit of responsible government.

But this is a reaffirmation urgently needed. It would, in fact, be a major step in transforming the mood of this country, thereby securing the political support to move ahead into new areas of action.

The campaign of building an effective political majority—a Kennedy coalition—will be waged on other fronts, particularly through the President's creation of a reputation as a wise and able chief executive. And, it is my belief, that despite the many current difficulties, a Kennedy coalition will evolve whose authority will be recognized and respected even by those persons at the core of the Republican-Southern Democratic opposition. When this day arrives, the diligent quest for political power begun with the Rules Committee victory will have been completed.

Note

May I add this note to the *Review* to express my pleasure at being again a participant in the affairs of the University and of the School of Business and Public Administration.

There is every evidence that the School is making noteworthy progress in its programs of undergraduate and graduate education and in research. The quality—and number—of graduate students is indicative of the strength of the graduate program. Sound advanced training not only provides personnel for industry, government and teaching but also lends impetus to faculty research projects.

The recent consolidation of the Bureaus of Business and Government Research to form the School's *Research Center,* and the vitality and viability of the new organization, speaks well for past planning and future prospects for research.

The *Center* offers opportunities for participation by the academic staff in projects which are satisfying to participants and valuable to the community. For example, planned for a year in consultation with interested public officials and private groups, there is now in the initial stages a thorough examination of the Missouri economy. The study will be of direct and immediate benefit to both business and government. It is hoped that this coupling of private and public support, interests and abilities may provide a pattern for future projects.

JOHN W. SCHWADA